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This paper presents a model of prostitution as an economic activity characterised by stigma, whose 
supply is based on the availability of other earning opportunities. On the basis of available empirical 
evidence  and findings from  other  studies,  we put  forward a rigorous economic  analysis  of the 
industry and its different markets making no restrictive assumptions regarding the gender, pay and 
nature  of  forgone  earning  opportunities  of  the  prostitute,  and  applying  the  same  behavioural 
hypotheses to prostitutes and clients. 
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“All of us, with the exception of wealthy and unemployed, take money for the use of our 
body. Professors, factory workers, lawyers, opera singers, prostitutes, doctors, legislators – we all 
do things with parts of our bodies, for which we receive a wage in return. Some people get good 
wages  and  some  do  not;  some  have  a  relatively  high  degree  of  control  over  their  working 
conditions and some have little control; some have many employment options and some have 
very few. And some are socially stigmatised and some are not.” 




Prostitution has many features in common with other activities entailing bodily service. It 
differs from these activities in many subtle ways but the biggest difference consists in the fact that it 
is,  today,  more  widely  stigmatised.  The  stigma  comes  from  a  moral  judgement:  historically, 
prostitution has been seen as immoral because non-reproductive extramarital sex has been viewed 
as immoral (Nussbaum, 1999; Ryley, 1936). 
Feminists are deeply divided on the issue of prostitution, and the debate between the “sex-
work” and the “abolitionist” lobbies is often heated and bitter. The proponents of sex work are in 
favour  of  protective  legislation  that  would  improve  the  working  conditions  of  prostitutes  and 
decrease the social stigma associated with prostitution, which lays at the heart of the violence many 
prostitutes experience. The abolitionists argue that prostitution is carried out primarily by women 
and therefore should be seen as part of the perpetuation of the traditional roles of power of men over 
women, and be abolished. Pateman (1988) explains that what is wrong with prostitution is the 
perpetuation of a contract where the patriarchal rights of men and women are re-affirmed, and the 
difference between workers in a capitalist firm and prostitutes is the re-enforcement of a contract 
that makes the subordination of women (and others) publicly recognised. The debate on prostitution 
also contrasts the selling of sexual services as opposed to the selling of the self: the basic idea here 
is that prostitutes sell sexual services, but not the self (Pateman, 1988; O’Connell, 2002).  
Economic analysis has so far concentrated on few attempts to model aspects of prostitution, 
such as the recent paper by Edlund and Korn (2002), which models prostitution as a highly paid, 
low skill female occupation alternative to marriage, and Garofalo (2002) who explains the different 
prices paid in the different prostitution markets in terms of the institutional configuration of the 
exchange, that is on the power asymmetries between contractual parties. More abundant are the 
empirically based studies such as those by Rao and Lokshin (2001) and Gertler et al. (2003) who   3 
focus on the health risk factor for street prostitutes, Moffatt and Peters (2001), who use the hedonic 
price method to investigate the pricing of prostitution services, and Cameron et al (1999). 
Prostitution is a multi-million trans-national industry mobilising internationally millions of 
workers, regulated in widely different ways, it is highly fragmented in different markets, in which 
different types of intermediaries are present (Thorbek and Pattanaik, 2002; Lim, 1997). Both men 
(the vast majority) and women demand prostitution services, and interviews with clients suggest 
that in exchange for their money or gifts they demand  ‘control of sex’ rather than just sex (Monto, 
1999;  Sanchez-Taylor,  2001;  O’Connell  Davidson,  1998).  It  is  mostly  entered  for  economic 
reasons, and is done largely but by no means exclusively by women. It is a high risk activity for 
prostitutes (both violence and health risk), and interviews with prostitutes suggest that the ability to 
identify and cope with such risks, together with those of maintaining emotional detachment and 
separation of one’s identity of prostitute from one’ other identities are all skills (Chapkis, 1997; 
McKeganey and Barnard, 1996). It can therefore be argued with Nussbaum (1999) that prostitution 
does require skills, but different from the ones we are used to measure. 
On the basis of findings from the social scientific and economic literature and available 
empirical evidence we model prostitution as an economic activity characterised by stigma, making 
no restrictive assumptions regarding the gender, pay and nature of forgone opportunities of the 
prostitute,  and  applying  the  same  behavioural  hypotheses  to  the  client.  We  derive  supply  and 
demand  functions  and  determine  equilibrium  results  that  allow  to  describe  prostitution  as  an 
industry with many different markets, and to simulate the effects of different policies and regulatory 
regimes. We conclude indicating ways forward in this research.  
 
2. Studies of Prostitution 
The social scientific literature on prostitution is vast (recent authoritative monographs on the 
subject are O’Connell Davidson, 1998, and Lim, 1998) and representative of many different views 
and concerns. A substantial part of the literature on prostitution consists of studies of prostitution as 
a crime (and particularly its relationship with other forms of crime), or health and drugs problems 
connected  with  prostitution.  Street  prostitutes’  safety  and  drug  problems  are  addressed  by 
McKeganey and Barnard (1996) in a UK-based study based on interviews with both prostitutes and 
clients,  which  finds  most  of  the  street  prostitutes  interviewed  indicating  their  motivations  for 
entering prostitution as “feeding a drug addiction” or “feeding a family”. This finding is supported 
also in the first of a three-part series on prostitution (Dispatches: Sex on the Street; Channel 4 
season Prostitution –The Laws Don’t Work, Channel 4, September 2002), which in its first episode 
on street prostitutes found that over 90% of them were drug addicts, and that this was their main   4 
motivation for entering prostitution. Maggie O’Kane, who carried out the research work leading to 
the programme interviewing 110 street prostitutes in 18 town and cities, also found evidence of the 
violence to which the estimated 30,000 street prostitutes in the UK are exposed
1. 
Motivations for entering prostitution are often found to differ in other “higher” segments of 
the  industry,  such as those found by  Chapkis’ (1997)  study of sex workers in parlours, escort 
agencies, and call girls, for  whom there appeared to  have  been more choice exercised  both in 
entering the business, and in controlling the conditions of their work and the way they felt about it. 
Evidence of the different working conditions in different parts of the industry was also found in the 
second episode of the Channel 4 programme that presented the stories of workers in different kinds 
of prostitution (mainly parlour-based). Sex workers described their working conditions as safer (in 
as far as the relationship with clients and pimps is concerned), and some of the workers were 
lobbying for de-criminalisation or legalisation, following the experiences of countries with a more 
open attitude towards prostitution which give legal protection to the workers (Australia and the 
Netherlands). The motivations of clients (who were all males and appeared to be representatives of 
all sectors of society) were also addressed in the third part of the series. These appeared to convey 
the impression that a connection existed between the effort and costs associated with finding a 
sexual  partner  who  would  readily  satisfy  their  sexual  preferences,  and  the  straightforward  and 
readily accessible option of prostitution. Such characteristics and motivations of clients are analysed 
in the collection of studies edited by Thorbek and Pattanaik (2002), which documents the increase 
in prostitution across borders. A sort of “psychological” profile of male sex tourists is drawn on the 
basis of their own descriptions of themselves and accounts of their experiences, which suggests that 
many of them are finding relationships with others very difficult (either because they don’t have the 
time or the skills required to meet people) and choose sex tourism as an “easier” alternative, which 
does not imply any responsibility. As for the views they hold of prostitutes, it appears that both 
sexism and racism mix in determining a very marked distancing, which allows clients to practically 
ignore and show no interest in the lives and working motivations of the prostitutes whose services 
they buy. 
Thorbek and Pattanaik (2002) also connect prostitution to international migration (increased 
number of men going abroad as sex tourists, military or UN, and increased number of women, but 
also men and children migrating from poorer countries to become prostitutes for male demand), 
looking at the patterns and characteristics of women’s migration and trying to describe the complex 
reality  of  trafficking  (which  varies  between  extremes  of  slavery  and  organised  migration  of 
                                                
1    “Nearly  three  quarters  of  the  women  interviewed  said  they  had  been  attacked  by  clients  in  the  previous  12 
months. Just under two thirds had been raped or seriously beaten, sometimes at gunpoint. Three quarters of the women 
don’t report attacks because they don’t think the police will care” (O’Kane, 2002).   5 
prostitutes who choose to travel themselves). Case studies are also presented in which prostitutes in 
tourist places describe their activity as a business and themselves as entrepreneurs. Women clients 
are also engaging in sex tourism, as documented both in Thorbek and Pattanaik, and in Sanchez 
Taylor  (2001).  The  latter  in  particular  offers  a more  in-depth analysis  of  North  American and 
Northern European women buying prostitution services of young men in the Caribbean, in what 
they themselves describe as ‘romance holidays’. Responses to her interviews suggest that, on the 
one hand, the women clients are mostly reluctant to define what the engage in as prostitution, and 
on the other that their ideas about the young men whose service they buy are deeply rooted in racist 
ideas about black men and black men’s sexuality. The theme of inequality appears to be at the core 
of the relationship: prejudices that allow the stigmatisation of another prostitute as fundamentally 
“different” and inferior to oneself appear again and again in customers accounts. 
Finally, all the studies mentioned address the relationship between prostitutes and pimps and 
the role of pimping, and several detailed studies exist that concentrate on the very specific nature of 
pimping as a criminal activity or a form of exploitation (Tiggey at al, 2000). 
 
3. Economics and prostitution 
Reynolds’ (1986) constitutes perhaps the most famous contribution on prostitution by an 
economist. The book contains an excellent review of studies on prostitution carried out in the US 
over the previous two decades across the social sciences (sociology, anthropology, geography and 
political  science),  addressing  issues  such  as  why  and  how  people  become  prostitutes,  the 
relationship between pimps and prostitutes, the role of prostitution in society and how prostitutes 
see themselves, the relationships between prostitution and drug use, and the political aspects of 
prostitution. The economic literature existing at the time of her study is classified in two strands: 
studies that deal with supply and demand of prostitution showing how it is similar to other markets, 
and  studies  in  the  economics  of  crime  that  analyse  the  costs  and  benefits  of  a  prohibition  on 
prostitution.  The focus of Reynolds’ study is  actually location: it is a geographical analysis  of 
prostitution markets in the US, addressing the question of why street prostitutes are to be found in 
certain  street  corners  and  not  in  others.  She  models  environments  for  prostitution  under  the 
assumptions of maximisation under constraint and discusses how actors in prostitution markets 
react to incentives and dis-incentives coming from the legal structure in the type of prostitution they 
engage in and the location of their activity. She then fits the models with data collected in 1982-83 
for different US locations, in order to assess the impact of different regulatory regimes for the 
activity. The conclusions reached by the study are that prostitution will always exist, even if it is   6 
prohibited by law, that limits can be drawn on the types of prostitution existing in each community, 
and that policies prohibiting prostitution altogether should be changed for the good of society. 
Scattered work by economists has been done on various aspects of the prostitution business. 
Recent studies include Rao and Lokshin (2001), who focus on the health risk factor and using a data 
set of 608 sex workers in Calcutta in 1993 interviewed by a team of social workers under the 
supervision of the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, found that the differential for 
condom use can mean a loss of up to 44% of their earnings for sex-workers. Gertler et al. (2003) 
also explicitly address the nature of the market for unprotected commercial sex in Mexico and find 
similar result. 
Another recent study on prices is by Moffatt and Peters (2001), who using clients’ data 
apply the hedonic price method to investigate the way in which prices of prostitutes’ services are 
determined. Prices are found to be affected by duration of the transaction, location, and age of the 
prostitute, and the factors that affect client satisfaction are found to not affect the price paid. The 
latter is regarded by Moffatt and Peters as a puzzling finding, although we would argue that this is 
actually not a contradictory finding, once a more sophisticated approach to defining demand and 
supply  of  prostitution  is  formulated,  capable  of  taking  into  account  not  just  price/quantity 
considerations. 
A good example of the latter is Garofalo’s work, based on a rigorous study of the Italian 
case and based on Bowles’ and Gintis’ theory of contested exchange and on the theory of positional 
goods  as  formulated  by  Pagano  (1999).  She  explains  the  different  prices  paid  in  the  different 
prostitution sub-markets in terms of the institutional configuration of the exchange, that is on the 
power  asymmetries  between  contractual  parties  (Garofalo,  2002).  On  the  basis  of  a  thorough 
argument based on the functioning of the patriarchal system in reproducing gender asymmetries, 
Garofalo stresses the fundamental role of prostitution in the construction of the gender identity of 
the client as male
2. This is the only work, to our knowledge, that attempts a rigorous gender analysis 
of female prostitution, as well as an economic one. 
The most famous recent work by economists on prostitution is however Edlund and Korn 
(2002), which provides the first theory of prostitution in economics to be accepted by a major 
journal. Their starting points are the following: prostitution in their model is low skills, labour 
intensive, female, and well paid. The key to this puzzle is found in the observation that a woman 
can be either a wife or a prostitute but not both: “If marriage is a source of income for women, then 
the prostitute has to be compensated for forgone marriage market opportunities”. Prostitution is 
                                                
2 A point that we will take and expand, in light of the reviewed evidence, to consider prostitution as part of more 
general structures of reproduction of social inequality (gender, race, class).   7 
defined as “The act of rendering, from the client’s point of view, non-reproductive sex against 
payment. A prostitute sells non-reproductive sex , while a wife sells reproductive sex” The price of 
prostitution in their model is equal to the price of sex within marriage and the female wage, so that 
in equilibrium: the price of commercial sex equals the price for sex within marriage (or the income 
the man needs to pay to the woman to marry her) plus the female wage rate. The demand for 
prostitution depends on the price of commercial sex, price of sex within marriage, male income, and 
on the proportion of married and  un-married men.  In their model  the  married men demand of 
prostitution is less than the unmarried men demand. Their main reason for this is that married men 
have  less  disposable  income  to  spend  on  prostitution.  The  paper  has  much  merit,  the  greatest 
perhaps being that of opening the debate in a discipline that has so far largely stirred away from 
such  a  controversial  issue.  The  assumptions  made  are  however  not  easily  verifiable.  The 
categorisation of prostitution as a female only occupation is incorrect, the idea that the supply of 
prostitution is fixed, i.e. exogenous, seems in stark contrast with the evidence on the population 
movements between Europe, Northern Africa, South-Asia (Thorbek and Pattanaik, 2002, Rodriguez 
et al., 2001), and what the authors present as their starting puzzle, that prostitution provides high 
wages for low skills is in our view based on a fundamental mis-understanding of the skills involved.  
 
4. Stylised facts 
 
In light of the surveyed literature and currently available data (which is abundant but very 
scattered and of difficult comparability), prostitution can be described as a multi-million industry 
mobilising internationally millions of workers, regulated in widely different ways.  
A. Supply. As regards supply, this is an activity mostly entered for economic reasons, which 
appears to be a job done largely but not exclusively by women (Aggleton 1998, Sanchez Taylor, 
2001).  Supply  and  working  conditions  depend  partly  on  the  availability  of  other  livelihood 
opportunities (not just other jobs and their pay, but also the working conditions) and partly on social 
stigma.  
B. Skills. Criminalisation and social stigma make this a high-risk activity for prostitutes 
(violence and health risk). Evidence suggests that the ability to maintain emotional detachment and 
separate one’s identity of prostitute from one’ other identities (Chapkis, 1999; McKeganey and 
Barnard, 1999) are skills, and skills are required (and developed on the job) to defend themselves 
and cope with risks, given the occurrence of violence against prostitutes is widespread and often 
little protection is offered by institutions. As argued by Nussbaum (1999, p. 284), prostitution does 
require skills, but different from the ones we are used to measuring.   8 
C. Demand. Both men (the vast majority) and women demand prostitution services. What 
emerges from interviews with clients is that they demand ‘control of sex’ for money, rather than, as 
conventionally believed, ‘sex’ for money. Studies that contain interviews with clients also suggest 
that the demand is underpinned by ideas of control and subjugation supported by patriarchy and 
racism, which provide an entitlement to use prostitutes by stigmatising them as inferior (see also 
Garofalo’s clients’ motivations regarding the construction of masculine identity). As it is often the 
case in matters of inequality, these same systems (patriarchy, racism, classism) provide mechanisms 
for a partial subversion of the stigmatisation, so that both prostitutes and clients describe themselves 
as in control of the relationship (Chapkis 1997; McKeganey and Barnard, 1996).  
D.  Market  fragmentation  and  intermediaries.  It  is  also  a  highly  fragmented  industry 
divided  in  different  sub-markets,  and  characterised  by  the  presence  of  different  types  of 
intermediaries,  which  play  a  particularly  important  role,  ranging  from  more  to  less 
exploitative(examples of trafficking and nuances of it at one end self managed prostitutes, including 
trade  unions  at  the  other),  and  appear  to  differ  in  the  different  sub-markets  (see  Channel  4 
programme, Tiggey et al. 2000, Sharpe 1998, Garofalo, 2002).  
 
5.  Modelling  the  role  of  stigma  in  the  market  for  sex:  a  reputation  model  of 
prostitution. 
To model prostitution taking into account social stigma, we develop a model  (along the 
lines of Della Giusta, 1999, developed to analyse social capital and market access), which explicitly 
includes reputation in agents’ preferences. We model stigma as a loss of reputation that can be 
incurred by both clients and prostitutes, and we then link reputations with income differentials (see 
section 5.7  below). Although  the  model is based on maximisation  under  constraint of a utility 
function for representative agents, whose behaviour is rational, we make a different behavioural 
assumption in that individuals are social beings and therefore aware of the presence of reputation 
effects in all their interactions. This affects their choices as much as do economic outcomes. Their 
utility is therefore defined on consumption (which will in turn be a function of their income and 
other characteristics) and on reputation. Reputation has both intrinsic and instrumental value: it is 
desired  per-se (provider of  utility)  and can be used to access other earning opportunities. This 
differs from other attempts to include reputation as a determinant of agents’ behaviour (see for 
example  Cameron,  2003)  in  that  we  make  an  explicit  link  between  reputations  and  earning 
opportunities. 
Stigma coincides with loss of reputation, which can affect pay and working conditions and 
access to other jobs for prostitutes, and can affect clients similarly. We also allow for agents to have   9 
a different concern for their reputation depending on their personal characteristics and the specific 
moment at which they exercise choice, so that, for example, someone with a high reputation may 
have little regard for it and act accordingly. 
We model determinants of supply and demand, following as closely as possible our list of 
stylised facts, and find the equilibrium quantity and price for commercial sex. We also produce a 
classification of different sub-markets in the prostitution industry, in terms of clients’ reputation and 
their relative preference for it, and prostitutes’ employment alternatives, their reputation and their 
relative preference for it. We do not model intermediation or risk in the present paper. 
Clients’ utility depends on the amount of commercial sex bought, on the consumption of 
ordinary goods, and reputation. Prostitutes’ utility depends on leisure (time spent not working in 
prostitution or other jobs), consumption of ordinary goods, and reputation. We maximise clients’ 
utility with respect to a budget and a reputation constraint, and obtain the marginal willingness to 
pay for commercial sex in terms of consumption of other goods and reputation loss. Analogously, 
for prostitutes we obtain the shadow price of leisure time in terms of the net gain of supplying 
commercial sex (which also includes reputation loss). Note that in our model everybody can be 
either prostitute or client, depending on their economic circumstances and available alternatives: 
some may not bear the stigma and would rather starve than sell sex, some would never purchase. 
We assign a specific functional form to utility, which allows us to model different agents by 
introducing relative preferences for consumption, reputation, and consumption of commercial sex 
and leisure. We thus derive demand and supply functions through which we obtain the market 
equilibrium, which through variation of the parameters can be applied to describe different sub-
markets in the prostitution industry. 
 
5.1 The demand side, the clients 
Let subscript c denote variables related to clients. Let the number of clients (as well as the 




0 = sex enjoyed without buying sex, “freely exchanged sex” 
Sc = amount of commercial sex bought 
Cc = ordinary consumption 
Ic = income beyond subsistence level 
Rc = reputation of the client when no commercial sex is bought 
w = price of commercial sex   10 
 
We assume that the total and exogenous income, Ic, is spent on ordinary consumption and 
paid commercial sex. Freely exchanged sex is, by definition, free. We thus have that: 
() c c c 1 C I wS = -  
Moreover reputation is reduced from the maximum Rc when commercial sex is bought in the 
market,  and  here  we  assume  that  when  commercial  sex  is  bought  it  is  also  observed  in  the 
community, so that a high Rc means that clients have much to lose reputation-wise when having 
commercial sex. To make things simple we let the clients reputation, denoted rc, be given by 
( ) c c c 2 r R S = -  
  We will assume that 
  c c p (3) R t(I I ) = -  
where Ip is the non-wage income of the prostitutes, which is hypothesised to be lower than the total  
income of the clients. The justification for this specification is that reputation is a positional good, 
which depends on what power clients have in relation to prostitutes. Here power is instrumented by 
how much richer the clients are relative to prostitutes when no sex is sold; t is a fixed parameter. 
The utility of the client depends on amount  of commercial sex bought, consumption  of 
ordinary goods and reputation, that is 
= +
0
c c c c c (4) U U (S S ,C ,r ) 
From  (4)  we  note  that  for  expository  reasons  we  assume  that  sex  bought  and  freely 
exchanged sex are perfect substitutes from a client’s point of view. This does not preclude the 
existence of people for whom these are two very distinct types of goods, but rather assumes that 
agents who purchase sex have the same attitude to purchased and freely exchanged sex
3. We will 
assume that the agent is maximizing utility, given the budget constraint. In what follows, and to 
keep things simple, we will assume that the amount of freely exchanged sex, Sc
0, is given and thus 
is a constant. 
 First, we have to find the criteria for buying sex at all. Inserting from (1) and (2) in (4) and 
maximizing with respect to Sc yields the following condition for participating in the commercial sex 
market: 
 
                                                

















Thus, the client will participate in the market for commercial sex if their willingness to pay for one 
extra amount of sex (given that they initially only enjoy freely exchanged sex) exceeds the price of 
commercial sex, plus the marginal costs of a worsened reputation for buying for the first time.  
  Given that (5) holds, then the first order condition for buying sex is given by:   
¶ ¶
¶ ¶
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Eq. (4) states that at utility maximum the marginal willingness to pay for commercial sex (in 
terms of consumption of ordinary goods) should be equal to the price of commercial sex plus the 
marginal cost of a worsened reputation due to purchases of commercial sex.  
 
To obtain more specific results we will assume the following functional form of the utility 
function 
= a + + a + a
a > "
0
c c c c 1 2 3
i
(7) U ln(S S ) C ln r
where 0 i
 
Thus, we postulate utility as a log-linear function in sex (freely exchanged plus commercial) 
and reputation and linear in consumption of ordinary goods. From (5), (6) and (7) we now get 
- -



















a 1 a 1 a
(8) S 0, if w w
S R t(I I )
Given that S 0, then
a 1 a
(9) w
S S R S
where
(10) {a ; 1 a , 0 a 1}
 
Note that Sc<Rc . 









S (R S )
, 
which clearly is fulfilled given the admissible region for a1.    12 
If a1=1, then reputation does not matter, and if a1=0 it is only reputation that matters. If a1 is 
high, the client is randy, less concerned about reputation; if a1 is low, the client is not randy, or 
more concerned about reputation. 
Obviously if a1=0, then Sc=0 and no commercial sex is bought in the market. To focus on 
the more interesting cases, we assume that  < £
1 0 a 1.  
From (8) we observe the following 
-  the more sex is exchanged freely, i.e. the higher SC
0 is, the less likely it is that sex 
will be bought in the market, 
-  the more reputation matters, i.e. the lower a1 is the less like it is that the individual 
will participate in the sex market, 
-  the higher the price of commercial sex is, the less likely it is that the agent will take 
part in the commercial sex market, 
-  the larger the income differential is, i.e. the larger the difference Ic-Ip, the more 
likely it is that sex will be bought.  
 
Given  that the sex is bought in  the  market,  then  from (9)  we can find  the demand  for 
commercial sex as a function of the price of commercial sex and maximum reputation. However to 
describe the demand curve it is more convenient to consider the price w as a function of the amount 
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, which is the standard “text-book” case with a downward sloping demand curve, and 
with the curve approaching the horizontal axis when Sc goes to infinity and to a1/SC
0 when Sc goes 
to  zero.  We  observe  that  if  SC
0  increases  the  demand  curve  for  commercial  sex  is  shifted 
downwards. When reputation matters, we observe from eq. (12) that the demand curve is shifted 
downwards relative to the demand curve when reputation does not matter. The higher the maximum 
reputation is, the closer the demand curve gets to the standard one. The interpretation of this is that 
the higher Rc is, the more commercial sex can be bought without destroying ones’ own reputation. 
From (12) we easily get that the demand curve is always downward sloping. The upper part 
of the demand curve is a convex function, with the demand curve approaching a1/SC
0 when Sc goes 
to zero, and the lower part is a concave function that approaches Rc when S goes to Rc. The value of 



















    
 
The demand curve is given in Figure 1. 
 
 
    [Figure 1 here]       
 
5.2 The supply side. 
Subscripts p denotes variables related to prostitutes. The amount of commercial sex sold 
reduces  both  leisure  and  reputation  among  prostitutes.  To  make  things  simple  we  measure 
reputation and leisure in the same units as commercial sex sold. Let Hp denote hours available for 
work in prostitution above those worked elsewhere. So if Hp is high, prostitutes have few other 
options than selling commercial sex; if it is low, prostitutes have many other options than selling 
commercial  sex.  Thus  leisure,  denoted  Lp,  equals  = - p p p L H S .  Prostitutes  derive  utility  from 
consumption  of  goods  and  services,  Cp,  which  is  financed  by  total  income  Ip+wSp.  Ip  is  an 
exogenous  income,  while  wSp  is  the  income  from  selling  commercial  sex.  Let  Rp  denote  the 
maximum reputation the prostitute can enjoy when no commercial sex is sold, so that a high Rp 
means that prostitutes have very little to lose reputation-wise when selling commercial sex and a 
low Rp means the opposite. 
The actual reputation is denoted rp=Rp-Sp.  
The utility is given by 
= p p p p p (15) U U (L ,C ,r ) 
Again, we have to start with the condition for participating at all as a seller of sex. Assuming 


















   14 
Thus, an individual will start to sell sex in the market if the price for selling the first amount 
of sex, minus the costs of a worsened reputation for doing so, exceeds the shadow price of leisure 
evaluated at zero sex sold.  Given that the individual participate as a seller, the optimal amount of 
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Thus, at optimum the shadow price leisure (the term to the right in (17)) equals the marginal 
net gain of supplying labour through the sale of commercial sex. This marginal net gain equals the 
price of commercial sex obtained in the market minus the shadow price of reputation. 
Again to proceed with more specific results we will assume that the utility function of the 
prostitute can be specified as 
= b - + b + + b -
b b b >
p p p p p p p 1 2 3
1 2 3
(18) U ln(H S ) (I wS ) ln(R S ),
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(19) S 0, if w
H R
-
> ³ +  
We clearly see that 
-  the higher the price if selling sex is, the more likely is that an individual will take 
part in the sale of sex, 
-  the more other working alternatives the individual has, i.e. the lower Hp is, the less 
likely it is that the individual will take part in the sex industry, 
-  the more reputation matters, i.e. the smaller  b1 is,  the  less likely  it  is  that the 
individual will sell sex, 
-  the less it takes to ruin the reputation, i.e. the smaller Rp is, the less likely it is that 
sex will be sold.     
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The second order condition is fulfilled given the permissible values for b1.  
So if b1 is high, prostitutes are less concerned about reputation; and if b1 is low, prostitutes 
are more concerned about reputation. We observe that if reputation does not matter, i.e. if b1=1, 




for Sp=0 and goes to infinity when Sp approaches Hp. 
Next we observe that if leisure does not matter, i.e. if  b1=0, we also get an upward sloping 




for Sp=0 and goes to infinity when Sp approaches Rp. However 
even if the prostitute does not derive any utility from leisure, there is an upper time-bound on how 
much labour he or she can supply. Thus also in this case the labour supply curve goes to infinity 
when Sp approaches  £ p p p H , provided H R . 
In the case when 0<b1<1, the supply curve is a weighted average of the supply curve when 
reputation does not matter and the supply curve when leisure does not matter. The weights are b1 
and (1-b1). In Figure 2 we  show the labour supply curves, given that  maximum leisure  is the 
binding constraint. 
 
                                     [Figure 2 here] 
 
If the maximum reputation capacity, Rp, increases, the supply curve is shifted downwards, 
which means that at given price of commercial sex, w, the prostitute is willing to supply more 
commercial sex. Again, as in the case of clients, a higher value for Rp means that more commercial 
sex can be sold without destroying ones’ own reputation.   
We will now turn to market equilibrium, when both clients and prostitutes participate in the 
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5.3 Market equilibrium 
At market equilibrium the price of commercial sex as seen from the demand side has to be 
equal to the price of commercial sex as seen from the supply side. The amount of commercial sex 
sold has to be the same, here denoted S*. 




+ - - -
1 1 1 1
0
c p p
a 1 a b 1 b
(21)
S* S R S* H S* R S*
 
Thus the equilibrium amount of commercial sex sold and bought in the market S* is a 
function of the exogenous parameters, i.e. S* = f(a1,b1,Rc,Rp,Hp,SC
0) 
 
Table 1. Changes in S* and w from increases in a1,b1,Rc,Rp,Hp, and SC
0 
Increase in  Change in 
a1  b1  Rc  Rp  Hp  SC
0 
S*  +  -(Hp<Rp) 
+(Hp>Rp) 
+  +  +  - 
W  +  +(Hp<Rp) 
-(Hp>Rp) 
+  -  -  - 
 
The table allows to examine the impact of changes in the key parameters on the equilibrium 
price and quantity of commercial sex. 
Thus,  column  2  indicates  that  the  more  the  clients  are  concerned  about  having  paid 
commercial sex and the less they are concerned about their reputation (corresponding to an increase 
in a1), the more sex is bought and sold in the market and the higher is the price of paid commercial 
sex. 
Column 3 indicates that the more the prostitutes are concerned about leisure at the expense 
of  reputation  (b1  increases),  the  less  commercial  sex  is  sold  at  a  higher  price,  if  there  are 
opportunities to work elsewhere (H is the binding constraint). If there are not (H is high), then the 
more commercial sex is sold for a low price. 
Column 4 shows that a lot of commercial sex is sold at a high price to clients with a high 
reputation capacity, i.e. less vulnerable clients, or clients who are able to cover to a great extent 
their sex activities, and (combining with column 2) this is more true the less they care about their 
reputation.   17 
Column 5 suggests that if it is difficult to have one’s reputation ruined by being found out as 
a prostitute, then a lot of commercial sex will be sold at a low price. This matches the evidence of 
temporary  immigrant  prostitutes  in  Europe  who  aim  to  work  in  prostitution  only  for a  limited 
amount of time to accumulate savings and then return to their country (see Thorbeke and Pattanaik, 
2002; Corso and Trifirò, 2003). 
Column 6 simply states that the fewer the alternative earning opportunities (Hp high), the 
more commercial sex is sold at a lower price. 
Column 7 says that the more sex the clients have at home, the less sex they buy and the price 
for commercial sex will also be lower. 
The  equilibrium  wage  w*  follows  from  either  (12)  or  (20).  In  Figure  3  we  show  the 
equilibrium for the case that  < < p c p H R R . 
 
                             [Figure 3 here] 
 
 
5.4  Reputation  as  a  positional  good:  the  market  for  paid  sex  when  norms  are 
endogenous 
In the preceding sections we assumed that the reputation variables were exogenously given 
and considered only demand and supply for representative agents on both sides of the market. Here 
we will relax the first assumption. Because of this, we also have to consider demand, supply and 
equilibrium for  the  population  as  a  whole and  not  only  for  representative  agent.  We  will  not, 
however, introduce any heterogeneity in the model, which of course has to be done in empirical 
specifications. To simplify exposition we let the total number of clients and prostitutes be the same 
and equal to N. 
Let 
(22)      {Xc= NSc and Xp=NSp}. 
To let norms related to reputation be dependent on what the agents do, we will assume that 
the more sex is bought and sold in the market, the more it will take for one single agent to ruin his 
or her reputation. We assume that reputation is a positional good and depends on the degree of 
income disparity between clients and prostitutes: 
(23)      Rc=t(NSc)(Ic-Ip), with t(.) being an increasing function of income differentials. 
(24)      Rp=NSp   18 
When the agents make their choice, we do not assume that they take (23) and (24) into 
account. The impact of individual sexual behaviour on the norms in the society has the character of 
being externalities. To simplify matters we have assumed that t(Xc)=t1Xc, where t1>0. 




1 c p c
c
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We now observe that the demand curve now will be a monotonously downward sloping 
convex curve, provided that NSC
0 is sufficiently small compared to Xc We observe that if NSC
0 is 
sufficiently large, the market for paid sex will disappear. Moreover we also observe that when a1 is 
sufficiently small the market for paid sex will disappear. If a1 is small, i.e. close to zero, reputation 
matters a lot for the individual clients.  
From  (20) and (24) we get: 
( ) ( ) 1 1
p p p
b N 1 N 1 b
26 w
N 1 H N X X
￿ ￿ - -
= + ￿ ￿
- - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
The supply curve is downward sloping for small Xp and upward sloping for large Xp; more 
precisely, if  p X ￿ is the minimum of the supply curve: 
( )















0 for X X
X
where X is defined by
b N 1 1 b
28














   
When  Xp  approaches  HpN, then  w  goes  to  infinity.  The  supply  curve  with  endogenous 
norms change considerably compared to when the norms were exogenous. The new supply curve is 
given in Figure 4 below. 
 
      [Figure 4 here] 
 
Let X* denote the equilibrium level of aggregate sex sold in the market. From (25) and (26) 
we get     19 
( )
1 1 1 1
0
p 1 c p
a b 1 a 1 b
29 X*
X* NS H N X* t (I I ) 1 N 1
￿ ￿ - -
- = + ￿ ￿
+ - - - - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
 
More than one equilibrium level is possible once reputation becomes endogenous. And the 
comparative statics corresponding to Table 1 will now yield ambiguous results, depending on the 
size of X* relative to NSC
0 and to HpN.  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
 
6. Markets and policies 
The modelling of reputation and stigma reflects the issues emerging in the literature and 
evidence on prostitution, where inequality appears as a fundamental driving force generating supply 
and demand.  A first general implication of modelling reputation as a positional good is that a more 
equal society, without immigration, would see prostitutes paid better and a lower demand than a 
more unequal one. 
More  specifically,  the  model  allows  simulating  the  effect  of  different  policies  for 
prostitution.  For  example  policies  that  recognise  prostitution  as  a  job  and  reduce  the  stigma 
associated with it, will have the effect of increasing the marginal net gain of supplying commercial 
sex, and increase the marginal willingness to pay for commercial sex. This should, in a closed 
economy, have the effect of increasing the price of commercial sex and, given the same availability 
of alternative earning opportunities and if there are constant intermediation margins, also increase 
the supply. However, in an open economy there always is immigration of illegal workers and out-
migration of clients (sex tourism), which would help keeping prices low. 
Another example is that of policies that increase the stigma of being clients, which have 
been used in the case of street prostitution where the latter is illegal, in the expectation that this 
would  reduce  supply  in  this  market.  According  to  our  framework,  this  reduces  the  marginal 
willingness to pay for commercial sex and not the quantity of commercial sex demanded, and will 
therefore imply that clients will try to reduce the risk of being caught or negotiate lower prices, 
rather than reducing their demand.  
A  third  example  is  given  by  policies  that  increase  alternative  earning  opportunities  for 
prostitutes. The effect of these policies will be felt on that part of prostitution which is supplied for 
lack of earning alternatives, and with simulations it can be established which of three possible 
effects will dominate: a reduction in supply and a permanent increase in price of commercial sex, or   20 
an increase in supply due to the increased price which will ultimately lower it again to the initial 
level, or finally a permanent reduction in supply due to an increased concern for reputation on the 
part of those who have been able to exit the market. 
Clearly the effect of policies greatly depends on the particular segment of the industry that is 
being addressed, and our model allows the description of up to 32 different markets within the 
prostitution  industry,  depending  on  clients’  reputation and  their concern  for  it, and  prostitutes’ 
employment alternatives, their reputation and their concern for it.  
Taking  the  demand  side  first,  recall  that  a  high  a1  means  that  the  client  is  randy,  less 
concerned about reputation and a low a1 means the opposite. Moreover, a high Rc means that clients 
have to much lose reputation wise when having paid commercial sex, and a low Rc the opposite. 
Then let Fc (i,j) mean a combination of i=H,L and j=H,L, for example (a1 high, Rc low). Then there 
are four combinations: 
(27)  {Fc(H,H), Fc(H,L), Fc(L,H), Fc(L,L)} 
For example, Fc(H,H), may be a randy judge, who has much to lose if caught purchasing 
commercial sex. 
Now  consider  the  supply  side.  For  prostitutes,  recall  that  a  high  b1  means  a  relative 
preference for more leisure and less concern for reputation, and a low b1 the opposite. Also, a high 
Rp means that prostitutes have much to lose reputation wise when selling commercial sex and a low 
Rp  the opposite. Furthermore, a high Hp indicates that prostitutes have few other options than 
selling commercial sex, and a low Hp indicates many other options than selling commercial sex. 
Again, let Fp (k,r,s)mean a combination of {k,r,s}=H,L for example (b1 high, Hp low, Rp low), so 
that all together there are 8 different cases for prostitutes. For example a student who prefers leisure 
and who is not concerned about their reputation, but has a lot of other options other than selling 
commercial  sex,  and  little  to  lose  reputation-wise  by  selling  commercial  sex  far  from  their 
environment will have Fp(H,L,L). 
Matching the cases generates 32 different possibilities, which can potentially describe 32 
different markets, or particular cases. A randy judge having paid commercial sex with a student 
would be the combination Fc(H,H) and Fp(H,L,L).  The price of paid commercial sex will be high 
and the amount sold will be little compared to the reference case of Fc(H,L) and Fp(L,H,L), which 
could describe clients not concerned about their reputation who have paid commercial sex with 
street  prostitutes,  who  typically  have  few  other  jobs  available  and  are  concerned  about  their 
reputation but the latter is not very high as they are poorer. This standard market relative to the 
others will have the lowest price and the highest amount of commercial sex sold (as can be seen in 
table 1).    21 
7. Empirical work and conclusions 
Empirical work is obviously needed to estimate our model and its applicability for policy 
simulations,  particularly  collecting  information  regarding  both  clients  and  prostitutes,  and 
addressing not just their income differentials and opportunities for alternative work for prostitutes, 
but also variables capable of addressing stigma and stigma perception. For example, measures of 
violence  against  sex  workers  as  against  other  workers  could  proxy  the  stigma  attached  to 
prostitution; the visibility of sex workers could proxy the reputation effect to clients; and similarly 
the extent to which sex workers lead a “double-life” (i.e. hide the fact that they sell sex) could proxy 
stigma perception by sex workers. 
The prostitution industry is fundamentally characterised by stigma and our model shows that 
it  is  possible  to  endogenise  this  key  feature  to  describe  demand  and  supply  conditions,  and 
determine different market equilibria. We have made no restrictive assumptions regarding gender, 
pay, and nature of forgone opportunities for the prostitute, and concentrating on income, reputation, 
and personal attitude variables we have determined price and quantities of equilibrium for different 
submarkets  and  more  importantly  produced  a  framework  in  which  the  effect  of  policy  can  be 
simulated. We believe our analysis sheds light on many issues that have so far remained formally 
unconnected in economic analysis, and given the present reviews of prostitution policies taking 
place across several countries, hopefully will attract more economists to produce work that can be 
usefully applied to policy formulation. 
   22 
References 
Aggleton Peter Ed. (1998), Men who sell sex London: UCL Press. 
Boyle, F.M., Glennon, S., Najman, J.M., Turrell, G., Western, J.S. and Wood, C. (1997). 
The sex industry: A survey of sex workers in Queensland, Australia Ashgate: Aldershot.  
Cameron S The economics of Sin (2002) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Cameron S., Collins A, Thew N, (1999), “Prostitution services: an exploratory empirical 
analysis”, Applied Economics, 31, pp. 1523-1529. 
Chapkis, Wendy (1997) Live Sex Acts: women performing erotic labour Routledge: New 
York. 
Corso, Carla and Trifiro’, Ada E Siamo Partite: Migrazione, tratta e prostitutzione straniera 
in Italia Firenze: Giunti 2003. 
Della Giusta, M., Di Tommaso M.L., Stroem, S. (2004) “' What money buys: estimating the 
demand for paid sex” mimeo.  
Della Giusta, M. (1999) “A Model of Social Capital and Access to Productive Resources”, 
Journal of International Development, 11, 921-934. 
Edlund L. and E. Korn (2002), “An Economic Theory of Prostitution”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol 110, No 1. 
Garofalo Giulia (2002) “Towards an economic theory of prostitution”, mimeo, University of 
Siena. 
Gertler et al (2003) “Risky Business: the Market for unprotected commercial sex”, mimeo 
Cornell University. 
International  Information  Centre  and  Archives  for  the  Women’s  Movement.  Web  site: 
www.iiav.nl. 
Lim, Lin Lean (1998) (ed.), The sex sector: the economic and social bases of prostitution in 
Southeast Asia. Geneva: International Labour Office. 
May, Tiggey, Alex Harocopos, and Michael Hough (2000) For love or money: pimps and 
the management of sex work London: Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit. 
McKigney, Neil and Marina Barnard (1996) Sex work on the streets: prostitutes and their 
clients Buckingham: Open University Press.  
Moffatt  P.G.,  Peters  S.A.  (2001)  “The  pricing  of  Personal  Services”,  mimeo,  Royal 
Economic Society in Durham, Apr. 2001. 
Monto, Martin A. (1999) Clients of street prostitutes in Portland, Oregon, San Francisco 
and  Santa  Clara,  California,  and  Las  Vegas,  Nevada  1996-1999.  University  of  Portland.  Ann 
Arbor: MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.   23 
Nussbaum, Martha (1998), “Whether from reason or prejudice: taking money for bodily 
services”,  Journal of legal studies XXVII, n.2, part 2. 
Nelson J.A. and England P. (2002), “Feminist philosophies of Love and Work”, Hypatia 
17(2) Spring. 
O’Connell Davidson, Julia (2002) “The Rights and Wrongs of Prostitution”, Hypatia 17(2): 
84-99. 
O’Connell Davidson J.(1998), Prostitution Power and Freedom, Polity Press, 1998. 
Pateman C. (1988), The Sexual Contract, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Perkins  R.  (1991),  Working  Girls,  Prostitutes,  their  Life  and  Social  Control  Australian 
Institute of Criminology. 
Rao, V,  Gupta I, Lokshin  M., Jana J., “  Sex Workers and the Cost of   Safe Sex: The 
compensating Differential for Condom Use in Calcutta”, mimeo Jan 2001. 
Reynolds, H. 1986, The Economics of Prostitution, Thomas, Illinois, USA. 
Rodriguez L. Guven-Lisaniler F. and Ugural S., “Sex work and State Regulations in North 
Cyprus” mimeo, presented at EAEPE Conference, Siena 2001. 
Ryley,  Scott  (1936)  A  History  of  Prostitution  form  Antiquity  to  Present  Delhi:  Shubhi 
Publications; distributed by APH Publishing Corp, 1999. Reprint of the 1936 ed. published by T. 
W. Laurie, London. 
Sanchez Taylor J (2001) Dollars are girl' s best friend? Female tourists'  sexual behaviour in 
the Caribbean 749-760 Sociology: Identity politics in the workplace Vol 35, num.3. 
Sharpe, Karen (1998) Red light, blue light: prostitutes, punters and the police Aldershot: 
Ashgate.   24 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Demand 
D when reputation does not matter
D when reputation matters
D when reputation increases
















Rp Rc S*  
   25 






Figure 5: Market equilibrium when reputation is endogenous 
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